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Inflation  and the EMS 
Abstract 
Since  the European  Monetary  System  was instituted  in March  1979,  there 
has been a dramatic  reduction  in  the inflation  rates  of member  countries. 
This development  is widely  attributed  to the EMS itself.  The purpose  of this 
paper  is to argue  that the theoretical  and  empirical  basis for such  a claim 
is far from  conclusive. 
On the theoretical  side,  the paper  develops  a model which  highlights  two 
issues.  First, changes  in the 'rules" of  the exchange  rate  system  need  not 
coincide  with  changes  in expectations  about  Central Bank  behavior.  In fact, 
expectations  in France  do not seem  to have  changed  until policy  makers "got 
tough"  in  1982-83.  Second, different  researchers  have made  quite  different 
assumptions  about exactly  what "rules" the  EMS imposes.  The paper  shows that 
how the system  works  matters in  terms  of  the effect  joining  will  have on 
inflation. 
On the empirical  side,  the paper  shows that  effects  which  have been 
attributed  to the EMS are  in  large part due to the global  deflation  since 
1979 and to the fact that EMS members  had relatively  low inflation before 
1979.  However,  even these estimates  should  be interpreted  with caution. 
They are very sensitive  to time period  and to which  nonEMS  countries  are 
included  in the sample. 
Susan M. Collins 
Department  of Economics 
Harvard  University 
Cambridge, MA  02138 I.  Introduction 
In 1978, the year  before  the European Monetary  Syatem  (EMS) waa 
inatituted,  (GFI) inflation  averaged  7.2% among the soon-to-be  membera.  The 
ratea  ranged  from  2.7% in Germany  to  12.0%  in Italy.  Inflation  rates  roae 
even further during  1979-80,  aa a tesult of  the aecond  oil shock.  By the end 
of 1986,  average EMS inflation had fallen  to 2.4%, and the range had narrowed 
considerably:  -0.2% in Germany  and 5.9% in  Italy.  The timing  of these 
developments  suggests  what  I will  call the "EMS-Inflation  Hypothesis" 
.  that 
the EMS  itself may have been  responsible  for the inflation  reduction  and 
convergence  which member  countries have experienced. 
There  seems to be growing  consensus  that the EMS-Inflation  Hypothesis  is 
true.  To  give two examples,  the )&j1 Street Journal  recently  ststed without 
qualification  that "the EMS has had its successes,  such  as helping  to  bring 
inflation  in the other countries  down  toward  the low level prevailing  in West 
Germany"  (September  8,  1987)  Giavazzi  and Pegano  (1987) assert that "the 
central  issue  is not whether  the EMS is an  effective  disciplinary  device  for 
inflation-prone  countries....  It is obvious  that their inflation  will  be 
:ower Ls:o  :.an -:ce  tEe 1MG" 
In  contrast,  early  studies of the EMS found little  evidence  supporting 
the Hypothesis.  Rogoff  (1985)  analyses data  through March,  1984.  He 
:onciudea  tnat: 
"the formation  of the EMS did nor produce a rapid convergence  of 
infletion  rates.  . .  there  is no evidence whatsoever  of  any convergence 
between  France's,  Germany's  and Italy's  inflation  rates  . ..  any 
convergence  that took  place was between  the inflation  rates of  Germany, 
Japan  and the United  Kingdom. 
.  . .  Even if  French, German  and Italian 
inflation  do ultimately  converge  at a low level, one should  be cautious 
in sttributing  this success  to the existence  of the EMS."  (p.  96) 
1 Padoa Schioppa  (1985) and  lingerer  et.  al.  (1983) are more optimistic,  but also 
find little evidenoe  fot the Hypothesis. 
The putpose of this papet  is to ask whether  existing  theoretioal  and 
empirical  evidence  supports  the ourrent  oonsensus  that  the EMS-Inflation 
Hypothesis  is true.  It is difficult  to test the proposition  oonolusively, 
because  to do so would  require comparison  of the actual  inflation experiences 
of member  countries  to a counterfactual-  the inflation  that these countries 
would  have experienced  if they had not joined  the EMS,  A simple  comparison 
of  pre and post EMS experiences  is inadequate  for a number  of reasons,  in 
psrticular,  because  external  shocks were quite different  in  the two periods. 
Similarly,  a simple  comparison  of  member  and nonmember  country experiences  is 
inadequate  because  the economic  structures  of the two groups of  countries  is 
likely  cc be quite different.  None-the-less,  it  would  seem  sensible  to 
believe  the Hypothesis  only if the evidence  (both theoretical  and empirical) 
consistently  supports  an  affitmative  conclusion. 
Why should  the EMS help to reduce  inflation?  The usual argument  is that 
membership  in the EMS provides  additional  "discipline"  to Monetary 
Authorities  in  inflation-prone  countries.  The key channels  of this 
"oisoirlir.e" are perhaps  best Lllusrratsd  in.  the :hsorsrmca.  modeL  ,ievsloped 
by Giavszzi  and Pagano  (198?).  In their framework,  joining  the EMS 
forces policy  makers  to accept  a higher  cost to expansionary  policy  through 
real  spreciation.  Reaii4nmenrs  are assumed  :o s'?sue  the currencies  of 
above-sversge  inflation members  by at most  enough  to restore Purchssing  Power 
2 Parity  (PP?).1  Therefore,  monetary  expansion  tauaea  inflation which leada  to 
a raal appreciation  (until  the next  realignment)  ,  and  the baa  in 
competitiveneaa  reducea output.  It is not aurpriaing  that inflation  will  he 
lowec  in  thia regime  that in a flexible  exchange  rate regime which  maintaina 
PPP chroughout,  regardless  of the domestic  inflation  rate. 
The model vecy intuitively  illustrates  two key channela  foc 
"discipline".  Firat,  ic providea  the Central  Bank  with added  incentivea  to 
cemain  tough and to stick  to an  auatecity  program.  Second,  it increases 
Central  Bank  credibility when austerity  ia announced.  A familiar  theme in 
theoretical  racroeconomic  literature  ia precisely  that the costs  nf 
disinflation  will  be smaller when domestic  residents  believe  that the prcgram 
will actually  be followed.2 
However,  the paper  can gg  tell  us whether joining  the EMS is likely  to 
reduce  inflation,  because  the theoretical  framework  begins with this as an 
assumption.  Taking  the EMS-Inflation  Hypothesis  as a given,  the suthors' 
interest  is when inflation-prone  countries  would  gain from  tying  their hands. 
An  alternative  would  have  been to sssume  that rsalignments  not only 
compensated  for cumulative  inflation differentials  since  the last 
oeali;nsrenc uc  a15o aouacad  icc  exoected  futurs inflation  diffecennais 
that the ?PP was maintained  on average over the duration of each fixed 
exchange  race.  See Ciavazzi  and Pagsno  (1985) and Collins  (l987b). 
2 McCallumm  (1984) discusses  and evaluates  the links between  credibility  and 
disinflation,  focusing on the United  Ststes. 
3 In fact, there are meny  reasons  to doubt that  the simple  announcement 
of joining  the EMS has been  viewed  by either Monetary  Authorities  or domestir 
residents  as tying  the hands of the Central  Bank.  I have  already  mentioned 
that virtually  no evidenoe  of monetary  or inflation convergenoe  emerged 
during  1979-82.  Sachs  and Wyplosz  (1988) show  that "stork prices,  capital 
outflows  and the forward discount"  during parts  of  1981,  1982 and early 1983 
"all point to a significant  worsening  in  confidence"  (p.  294)  in French 
macroeconomic  and exchange  rate policy,  Expectations  of disinflation 
emerged,  not when  France joined  the EMS in  1979, but after domestic  policies 
turned  sharply restrictive  in  1982-83.  Many  authors have  discussed  also the 
role of  capital controls  in enabling  France  (and Italy)  to conduct 
independent monerary  policies.3  It is  not at  all clear what  role the EM'S 
played  in  the reversal.  In  particular,  if France had opted  for austerity, 
and had stuck  to a consistent  program  of restraints,  the disinflation  may 
well  have occurred  even  if  France had still belonged  to the Snake. 
This paper  applies work on  international  policy  coordination  to the EMS 
to ask  whether  joining  the EMS should have  helped  to reduce  inflation  rates 
after the second  oil shock.4  Other  papers which  study policy  coordination  in 
the EMS inciuda Canconeri  and Gray 1985)  ,  Melicz  (L9SS  .  Cudi:  (1785' 
Ciavazzi  and Ciovannini  (1986b)  ,  Canzoneri and Henderson  (1987) and  Roubini 
Giavazzi  and Psgano  (1985) provide one discussion  of capital controls. 
Useful  references  to the policy  coordination  literature  include Buiter  and 
Marston  (1985)  ,  Canzoneri and  Henderson  (1987) and Fischer  (1987) 
4 (1987) and are discussed  further  in  Section  II. 
This approach  does allow us to ask whether,  ceteris parabus,  joining  the 
EMS is likely  to reduce  inflation.  Ic is also  useful  because  it focuaea  on 
how the rules defining  the interaction between  countries  affect  the outcoaea. 
Three interrelated  issues are involved:  the impact on  expectationa  and 
on  wage setting  behavior,  the affect  on Central Bank  resolve  and/cr 
objectives  and the implications  of  changing  the rules  of  the game".  Jhile 
it is possible  to  eubaurne  all three undec "changing  the culea of the game" 
and to derive  the implications  theoretically,  I  believe  that the issues  are 
separate  in the real world,  and that it is useful to  distinguish  among  them. 
As discussed  above,  joining  the EMS need  not have tied  the hands  of the 
French  Central Bank,  and need  not have influenced  expectations  about  future 
prcea and exchange  rates.  However,  the EMS is an  unusual  multilatecal 
exchange  arrangement  with  different  'rules' than alternative  exchange 
arrangements. 
Section  II of this paper  applies the international  policy  coordination 
approach  to the EMS under  alternative  interaction  rules.  It  has  two 
objectives.  The first is to  examine  the implications  of alternate  exchange 
cegioea  Lncl hog  coopecati'e  ond uonccopecative  )n avcaga 1oh:ioo  c. 
on the divergence  of inflation  rates under  the saaumption  that wage formation 
and exchange  rate  expectations  are unaffected.  If  being  in the EMS has no 
afdecc  on Canccal  3ank ocadibility,  chat affect cdl i: a'e  :'.  Yifladon? 
The aetond  is to compare the inflationary  implications  of shifts in 
expettationa  undec  the alternative  exchange  rate regimes.  If  a Central  Bank 
manages  to convince  domestic residents  that it will carry through a 
disinflation,  does it matter  what  the exchange  regime  is? To anticipate  one of  the punchlines  from  the theoretical  analysis,  how 
inflation  within  the EMS differa  from  inflation  in a nonEMS regime  depende 
critically  on how the EMS exchange  tegime  is specified.  Thie  point is also 
stressed  by Canzoneri  and  Henderson  (1987), however,  they  use a different 
framework,  and do  not attempt  to separate the effects of  different  rules  from 
the effects  of  a change in  credibility. 
In fact, there  is widespread  disagreement  about how to model  the System. 
(The various  approaches  are discussed  in Section  II.)  The paper  shows  that, 
depending  on  one's  view, one could  expect  that the EMS regime would either 
raise or lower  the mean  and  variance  of inflation among  members.  Thus, 
theoretical  analysis alone  can not support or refute  the EMS-Inflation 
Mypothesis.  Many of  the questions  are empirical  ones. 
There  is  relatively  little empirical  analysis  of the impact  of the EMS 
on inflation.  While  a detailed empirical  analysis  is not the focus of this 
paper, it is informative to  explore  some of  the evidence.  Proponents  of the 
Hypothesis  often  point to empirical  findings  in Ungerer et. ml.  (1986). 
Their  paper  estimates  inflation  equations  across a large  sample of industrial 
countries  from  1974 to lpg4,  and finds that the coefficient  on an EMS "dummy" 
variable  is consistently  negative  ano significant.  Mcwevec,  in addition  to 
some  econometric  problems,  there are alternative  explanations  for their 
findings.  In  particular,  many  nonEMS  countries  also underwent  deflarions 
after  1979. 
The paper  is composed  of three remaining  sections.  Section  II develops 
a theoretical  model, and identifies  a number  of  ways  to specify  the EMS 
exchange  regime.  It then  examines  the inflationary  implications  of various 
regimes.  Section  III reviews  and extends  the empirical  evidence.  The final 
S section provides  a summary and discussion  of the EMS-Inflation  Hypothesis 
in light  of the theoretical and empirical  findings. 
II.  A Theoretical  Framework 
This section  theoretically  examines  the implications  of  different 
exchange  regimes for the mean and the variance of intra-EMS  inflation.  To 
highlight  the view that the announcement  of a change  in  government  policy  is 
not enough  to change perceptions  about  the future, I choose a  version  of the 
two country  Mundell  Flemming model  in  which  expectations  are backward 
-looking.  Oudiz  (1985) uses a similar framework  to simulate  the welfare 
gains under  alternative  regimes  for EMS countries. 
It is  important  to  note that the framework  considers  deflation  from  an 
initial  inflationary position  -  a  realistic  depiction  of the post  1979 oil. 
shock situation.  It does not analyse inflation arising  from  a game played  by 
labor unions and policy  makers  which  is the approach  taken by Giavazzi  and 
Giovannini  (1986b) and Canzoneri and Henderson  (1987) among  others. 
A Simple  Model 
There  are :vo coen:rles,  caThaa  irance  na  many  nomen '  . 
*  * 
produce aggregate  outputs, y and y ,  at prrces  p and p  .  The  nominal 
exchange  rate, e, is the price  of  deutschemarks  in terms  of  francs.  All 
variables  (with  the exception  of interest rates)  are memsured  in logs and 
output  is measured  as deviations  from full  employment.  The subscript  will 
denote  time. 
Output  is demand  determined,  as  described  by  equations  (la)  and (15), 
Demand  increases  as a result  of a real depreciation,  a rise in  foreign output or a decline  in real interest rates. 
(is)  y — as  + by- Ott 
*  * 
(Ib)  y  -as + b-y-  or 
where  s  e  + p 
- 
Pt  i5 the  real  exchange  rate,  r  a i  - 
P÷1 
+  Pt  and 
- p + p'  are real interest rates.  The superscript  denotes  the 
expectation  at time t. 
Capital is assumed  to be freely mobile5  (equation  2).  Equation  (3) 
describes  real  exchange  rate  expectations  as static, but allows  for a shift, 
u.  This specification  captures  the ides  that different  regimes  need  not 
alter market  beliefs  about  the future, but allows  for changes  in  perceptions 
independent  of  the regime.  The assumption  also simplifies  the analysis 
because  it implies that the problem  for policy  makers  is time separable. 
Equations  (2) and (3)  imply  that real interest rates differ  only  by u. 
(2) i  - i  — ee  - e 
I  I  tei  I 
(3)  eC  + p 
-  p°  e  + p 
-  p  + u 
t+l  1*1  1+1  I  I  I 
(4)  rt 
— r  + u 
For most of the discussion,  u willoe  assumed equal  to zero.  The 
consequences  of a nonzero u  are exsmined  at the end of the section. 
The evolution  of  domestic prices  is given by (5a) and (Sb)  .  It depends 
Roubini  (1987) simulates  the effects of  capital controls  in an EMS without 
realignment. 
S on lagged  (CPI) inflation  and deviations  from  full employment  output.6 
Consumer  prices. p and  p', are a  weighted  average of prices  in each  country 
(equation Ga and Gb) and inflation  is it  — ,a 
- 
(5a)  Pt 





(Ga)  p  P 
+ (l-A)(e+  — 
Pt 
+ (l-A)s 
(Gb)  = AP:  + (l-)(p-  e)  p4 -  (l-A)s 
Equations  (7a) and 7b) relate  real balances  to income in each  country. 
(7a)  m  - 
Pt 
=  (7b)  m 
-  — 
Substituting  from (5)  into  (7)  it is clear that authorities  in each  country 
can directly  control  their own output  level through monetary  policy.  To 
simplify  the notation,  output  ia taken as the instrument  of the monetary 
authorities. 
Finally,  French  and Cerman  authorities wish to minimire  a loss function 
Ccuaccrn  I  :an be eri-red cnder  the asaumotijns  :bat :he trics ti 
domestic  output  is a mark-up over  wages  (w  — p) and that  wage inflation 
depends on  lagged  CFI  inflation and current output (w  —  w  +  it  + 
The same specification  is  assumed  in Germany. 
9 that is quadratic in inflation  and output.7  As already mentioned  it is not 
necessary  to consider the entire interremporal  problem, because  utility is 
separable  over time periods.  The remainder  of the section  will drop the time 
subscripts,  except  where it is confusing  to do so. 
(8a)  L  (y2 + 2)/2  (Sb)  L*  (yS± r2)/2 
To solve the model,  each  country's inflation  must be solved for in terms 
of outputs.  This is easily  done in two steps.  First,  equations (I) and (4) 
give the following  expressions  for real  exchange rates and real interest 
rates: 
1l+h) 
(9j  s  (y 
-  +  U 
Il-b)  *  1 
(lOa)  r—-  (+) + 
(lOb)  r*  - 
{  (y + y) 
-  u 
As usual, the real exchange  rate depends  on differences  in the policies  of 
the two countries,  while the real interest  rates  depend on combined policies. 
The second step is to solve  for inflation  using equations  (5),  (6) and 
(9)  .  Notice  that changes in expectations  formation (u) are equivalent  to 
shifts  in the predetermined  portion  of inflation (lr).  France is assumed to 
Oudiz (1985)  estimates  a higher  weight  on inflation in Germany's  objective 
function  than for any of the other EMS countries.  Incorporating  this 
asymmetry  would provide an additional  channel for inflationary  bias in 
France. 
10 have  a higher  base inflation rate than  Germany  >it.  So far,  this is the 
first  assymmetry  between  the two countries. 
(ha)  lt—lr+'yy+a(y-y) 
(fib)  m* 
* + 
* 
where  i  ir  + (l-)(s  + cu/2a)  , 
0  0-0  0-0  0  0 
(l-A)(s+ cu*/2a)  and  a  (l-)(l+b)/2a 
Our primary  interest  is in the average inflation  rate and in the divergence 
between  the two countries  inflation  rates,  These are simple  functions  of 
average outputs and of the divergence  between outputs  respectively. 
(l2a) 
a —  + yy*  (12b)  —  +  (i+2a)y 
where  x* — (x+x)/2  and  xd  (x-x)/2. 
We also  solve  for French  output  as a function of the nominal  exchange 
rates,  which will  be useful  for examining  policy  regimes  in  which the 
exchange  rate, not the money supply, is the policy  instruosent,  Using 
equations  (1), (5) and (10), we  get; 
C 
where  — 2s/(l+b+2a-y) 
and e — p 
-  p 
-  -  cu/2a  0-1  0-1  0—1  0-1 
cuat:on  3  also otnts ouc that if  Francs uses monetary  :oLlc" sets 
output)  so as  to maintain  a fixed nominal exchange  rate,  France must 
essentially  follow  German  leadership  by  adjusting  domestic  policy  one-for-one 
with German  policy,  In the fixed exchange  rate regimes,  it is convenient  to 
hi assume  that the nominal  exchange rate  is set equal  to a. 
B.  The EMS: Alternativee 
The next step is to  specify  alternative  exchange  regiaes.  Ideally, we 
would  like to compare  the EMS to the most likely  nonEMS  regime.  However,  not 
only is it is difficult  to identify the latter,  there is also considerable 
disagreement  over  how to best  model the EMS itself.  The many  views  can be 
grouped  accotding  to whethet  policies  ace chosen  cooperatively  or 
non-cooperatively  and  whether  Germany and other  members  are treated 
syr.metrically or asymetrically. 
Many authors assume  both non-cooperative  behavior  and assymetry by 
depicting  Germany  aa the "leader". For example,  Fischer  (1987, p.  41) says 
that "the  EMS can  be viewed  as an  agreement  by  France and Italy to accept 
German  leadership  in  monetary policy,  imposing constraints  on  domestic 
monetary  and fiscal policies." 
There are two different  formulations  of German  leadership.  The first 
assumes that  Germany  sets monetary policy  while the other members  subordinate 
their monetary  (and fiscal) policies to maintain  fixed  exchange rates.8  This 
regime  has been used  to model  the EMS by  Ganzoneri  and Gray (983) and by 
Roubini  (1987), while  Oudiz  (1985) uses  it to model  the Snake.  An 
alternative  assumption,  adopted by  Giavazzi  and Giovannini  (1986)  ,  is  that 
8 
For simplicity,  I model  the EMS as establishing  fixed  exchange rates  among 
members  between  realignments.  This is potentially  prob1n'eric  for Italy, 
which  maintains  bands  of  +/- 5.0%. 
12 Germany  sets  its monetary  policy  while the other members  set their exchange 
rates relative  to the deutschemark.  One obvious problem  with the first 
approach  is that it  rules  out the possibility  of  exchange  rate  adjustments 
through  real.igninent.  On the other hand,  the second probably  goes too far in 
allowing  exchange  rate  adjustment  each "period'.  (The appropriateness  of  the 
alternative  approaches  is discussed  further below.) 
Canroneri  and Henderson  (1987) discuss both cases,  They  point  out that 
it  makes  a difference  which  approach  is  taken.  The first  is a game in  which 
both  countries  select  quantities  (of money)  ,  while the second  is a game in 
which  one player  (Germany) selects  a quantity while  the other  selects a price 
(the exchange  rate).  It is a well  known  result  from game theory  that,  in 
most cases,  the outcome  of a game depends on  whether  the instruments  are 
prices  or quantities. 
Melitz  (1985)  takes the opposite  tack,  He  assumes  that EMS policy 
making  is cooperative  and treats the members symmetrically.  Roubini  (1987) 
and  Oudiz (1985) both condsider  cooperation  as one of many alternative  views 
of the EMS. 
Finally, countries  may act symmetrically,  but noncooperatively.  If both 
coL.c'r  makats  sa .'nonetarv poLicy  as an instrnment,  and set chair  own poLc; 
under  the assumption  that the other country's  instrument  is given,  this 
scenario  is  the familiar  Cournot-Nash  game  which  is often  used  as a benchmark 
against which to compars  the '1S. 
Thus,  a total of five alternatives  will  be considered,  Three  are 
noncooperative  and assume that  each  policy  maker sets its own ins  rrnent to 
minimize  domestic  loss,  taking the other country's  policy  as gi.  In  the 
remaining  two, policies  are set cooperatively  based  on an eqts1ly weighted 
13 function  of losses  in the two countties.  In each  case,  policy makers  are 
assumed  to expect  that real exchange  rate expectations  are static  (u=O) 
To facilitate  the comparisons,  outcomes  under each regime are depicted 
grsphically,  From  Equation  (12),  it is clear  that,  given it  and  it,  ya and 
yd determine  average  inflation and the inflation  differential.  The 
a  d  a  d 
expressions  for  y ,y  ir  and r  in each  of the five  regimes are given  in 
Tables  1  and  2.  These  variables  are the focua of  the regime  compariaona. 
l.Cournot-Naah  LQ.)  Policy makers  in  each country choose output  to minimize 
losaes, aa shown in (14). 
(l4a)  Mm  (y2 +  (l4b)  Mm  (y*  1r 
y  y 
— it  + yy +  a(y-y  )  it  — it  + -yy 
- 
The  first order conditions  imply  the following  reaction  functions: 
(lEa)  y  — 
N  (Qy* 
- it)  (lfb)  y* — 
AN  (my 
A  a 
The equilibrium  ie snown Th Figura  ,  an  point  C.  'e French  and German 
reaction  functions  are labeled MN  and NM respecr:.t.y.  The bliss  points 
are denoted  by B and B.  The result  is a familiar one.  The countries  engage 
in  a competitive  deflation.  France, the country  which inherited  a higher 
inflation  race, persues  the more restrictive  policy: ycy  and  yd<o  (Table 1). 
The French  real  exchange  rate appreciates  (see equation 9)  ,  and  as shown  in 
Table  2,  there  is some convergence  in  inflation  rates (/  r1). 
14 2.Cerman-Leadec-shjp Q1  Germany sets output  (monetary policy>  independently 
while  France  maintains  a fixed nominal  exchange rate.  German  authorities 
minimize  (16) while  France  simply  follows, setting y—y 
(16)  Mi (y*S÷ 
y 
it  — i  + 'yy- cs(yy*) 
y=y 
The first order  conditions  imply the following  solution: 
(17)  y  — -  it  —  y  /l+21 
Graphically,  Germany chooses  the point  along y—y  which  gives highest  German 
utility.  This is denoted by point  C in Figure  1. 
Because  Germany knows  that France will follow  its policy  lead,  there  is 
no  competitive  deflation.  Policies are less restrictive  in both  countries 
that in the Cournot Nash equilibrium  discussed  above.  Average  inflation  La 
higher  than in the Nash  outcome,  and there is no move towards convergence: 
1d—  ird  (Tables 1 and 2). 
i..,  oonera:on y.  Fixed Exchange  :  F:ance  and  a'nany  ec  oucouca 
cooperatively  and maintain  a fixed exchange  rate.  Thus,  on policy  is 
chosen  to minimize  the (equally weighted)  loss function  in (18). 
tin  .2 
y,  1' 
—  +  -yy + a(y-y ) 
it  —  + 
-vy 



































































 The first  order conditions  imply: 
(19)  y— 
- Air-y 
The outcome (denoted  by F in Figure  1) is more deflationary  than the 
noncooperative  German  leadership  with fixed  exchange  rates  because it takes 
into account France's  higher  base inflation  (Table  2).  German  welfare is 
lower  than it was at  C, but French  welfare is higher. 
.Cooperation With Realignment  France  and Germany  set outputs and the 
nominal exchange  rate cooperatively.9 
(20)  Mm  (y2  2)/2  (y+  2)/2 
y, y 
— ir  + -y 4- a(y-y  ) 
—  y*  -  a(yy*) 
2  *2  aZ  .52  2  *2  a2  dZ  - 
Noticing  that (y  y  )/2  it  ,  (20)  is 
equivalent  to (21).  The problem  can be separated  into selecting  average 
outputs and the divergence  between  outputs. 
(21)  in  (*2 4-  /2  +  (.52 3d2 '2 
it  —  it 
S  d  it  —  it  (y+2a)y 
Roubini (1987) points  out that  whether or not countries  sterilize 
intervention  in foreign  exchange  markets determines  whether  a cooperative 
system  in name operates  symmetrically  in  practive. 
17 In  the solution  (Tables 1 and 2),  avatage  inflation  is tha same in  tha 
two cooperative  regimes.  The only  difference  is that when realignment  is 
allowed,  the high inflation  country  (France) will  follow  more deflationary 
policy, and will  experience  a real  appreciation.  Table I also shows  that 
output  divergence,  yd is larger  under  the cooperative  regime with realignment 
then  it  was in  the noncooperative  Nash.  Therefore,  there is greater 
convergence  of  inflation  rates. 
Graphicelly,  the outcome  is denoted by R in  Figure  1.  It is along  the 
constant  average  inflation  line that passes  through G.  The larger  output 
divergence  relative  to Cournot-Nash  implies that  the rey from  R to the 
origin  is flatter  than the ray from  C to the origin, as  drawn. 
5..Money-Exchsnze-Rste Qj)  The finsl  regime  is the most  complex.  Germany 
sets output  (monersry policy)  taking  the nominal exchange  rate as given  while 
France  controls  the exchange  rate, taking  German  output  as given. 
(22a)  Mm  (y2 + ir2)/2  (22b)  Mm  (y*S *2)/2 
e  y 
—  + -yy  + o(yy*)  ir  + y*  a(y-y) 
yr(e+ic) +y  y—r(e+s) +y 
To  simplify notstion,  we take xr(e+s) as the French  policy  instrument.  As 
shown  in (23a)  ,  the  first order condition  for France parallels  the one from 
the Nash game.  Even  though  the policy  instrument hss changed,  France  would 
like the same change in  domestic output  in  response to  changes  in foreign 
output  as in the Nash  game. 
18 (23a)  y  x + 
*  - 
(23a')  x — - ir  + (A-l)  y 
Equation  23a' gives  the French reaction  function.  An appreciation  partially 
offsets  the German  expansion  so that France  responds  to a German  expansion 
with  a smaller  domestic  expansion. 
Solving  the German  first order conditions,  we get Germany's  reaction 
function  in (26),  Notice  that, given  the nominal  exchange rate, Germany 
expects French  output  to move  one-for-one  with its own.  Not surprisingly, 
the German  reaction here  parallels  the German  Leadership  game. 
(24)  y  * -A  (s  OX) 
To facilitate  comparison  of the outcome under  this regime with the 
outcomes under  the other  four regimes, we focus on the equilibrium values  of 
y and y  -  As  before,  the averages  and divergences  of output  and inflation 
are given  in  Tables  1 and 2. 
It is also  useful  to depict  the outcomes  graphically.  Figure  2 shows 
the equilibria  for the four regimes discussed  above  together with the  •-  ,ov3 :e  : 
y  that will result from  the  French  selection of  given each  y  As noted 
above,  this relationship  is simply NN. 
Equation  (24) shows  the ',  Germany will select  given  x.  The 
reiatrcnship  between  y  and the implied value  of  y is given  by (25).  The 
tradeoff  for Germany  is flatter than it was  in  the Cournot Nash 
19 game.1°  Taking  x aa given,  Germany now expects y to move  one-for-one  with  y. 
Therefore,  y  ia less responaive  to different values of y than if  Germany 
polioy  makers  rook y aa given. 
(25)  y*  1M (my 
-  m)  /[l+y(ro)J  < 
Equation (25) is shown aa  in  figure  2.  It crosses  EN  ar y  G. 
It also  passes  through  the point  GL.  The equilibrium  for the money exohange 
regime  ia denoted by  N. 
Although  leae deflationary  than  the Nash,  thia regime  ia more 
deflationary  than  any of the other  formulations of the EMS.  This ran be 
shown  by noting  from  Table  2 that  average output  under  the N,  G,  F and  R 
regimes can  be rewritten  as: 
N:  y—-wor  -wir  15  25 
(26)  G:  y  Ira 
FandR:  y -w  a  GO 
where  so  ,  i1,2,N,G  are defined  in Table  2 and or >or.  1  5  5 
it  ia straightforward  to show that w < u <  w  .  so  that G ia :he most  2  1  2  5 
deflationary,  followed  by M and then  by the two cooperative  regimes.  The 
intuition  is that  France  engages  in  the same competitive  deflation  here  as in 
the Nash game.  But because  Germany  expeors y and y  to move  orgether,  roliry 
10 
Canzoneri  and Henderson  (1987) provide additional  discussion  of the choioe 










































tmakers  engage  in less  competitive  deflation. 
Figure  2 alao shows clearly  that the tvo types of "Cerman-Leedership  ate 
very different.  If leadership  means  that high inflation  EMS members  must  use 
their policies  ro peg the exchange  rate  (C)  ,  the  outcome is less deflationary 
than  a cooperative  policy  would be.  The opposite  is true if Cermmn  leadership 
means  that Cermany  sets monetary  policy  independently,  and the other  members 
select  the exchange  rete (H) 
A  final  issue is the extent of  policy  divergence.  While  it is clear 
that there  is more output  divergence  (and therefore  inflation  convergence)  in 
the H than in  the C regime,  the comparison  between  the H and R regimes  is 
ambiguous.  Manipulating  the expressions  for  in  Table  2,  it is possible  to 
show that policies  diverge more in  the R than in  the H regime as long as a is 
not too small relative  to 711  The smaller a, the less  sensitive  domestic 
inflation  rates are to foreign output, and the smaller  the scope for EMS 
members to manage  polity  differentials  cooperatively  so as to foster 
inflation  convergence. 
11 The algebraic  condition  is quite  complex.  A sufficient  (but not necessary 
condition)  for greater  inflation convergence  with  cooperative  resHsnment 
than with the money-exchange  regime  is that a > /2. 
22 Table 1:  Policy Under Alternative Regimes 
Regime  Average  ('a)  Divergence  (y) 
oncooperative 
d  a  a(+a)  ir 
Cournot  -Nash  ________  - 
i+(y+a)(+2a) 
German-  Leader  — 
Honey 
-  Exchange 
+  —  -  —  - —  —  1  a  a  * 
{(l++a)) 
d  a 
2  a,  o  2  oJ 
Gooperative 
a 
ixed Rates  0  — 
a  d 
-r  — —  -  - 
vhete  r 
23 Table 2:  Inflation Under Alternative gjes 
a  d 
Regime  (ir  )  Divergence (lr 
Noncooperative 
a  d 
IT 




a  (  y  German-Leader  IT  -i 2  d 
0  0  0 
or 
Money 
-  Exchange 
L 
2  2 
J 
a  *  1  1[l+a( 
d 
I  0  2 
IT  +2a)J  or  or 
J 




0  d 
2  or  Fixed Rates 
r—-- 
a  or 
o-Y  it 
Realignment  —---—2  0 
where  c 
24 C.  Inflation  Under Alternate  Regimes 
Using  Figures  1  and 2, and Tablea 1 and 2,  it ia atraightforward  to 
compare  che average and the divergence  of inflation ratea acroaa  regimes. 
The results are summarized below, 
Average  Inflation  (la)  Cournot  C  Money-  C  German  C  Cooperation 
Nash  Exchange  Leader  (Both) 
Inflation  Di.'ernrn.re  z)  Cooperation  C  Cournot  C Fixed  Rates 
Realignoer.t)  Mesh  (German Leader 
and Cooperation) 
As discussed shove,  the  rsnklng of  he money-  exchange  regime  in  terms of 
inflation divergence is  ambiguous.  There Is  clearly  less divergence  than in a 
Mash  game,  but  there msy  be  either more or less  than  in  the cooperative  regime 
with  realignment. 
At the beginning of the EMS, all members had relatively high inflation 
as a result  cf the 1979 oil price  increases.  Inflation rates would  have 
fallen under  sny of the five regimes, however,  they would have fallen  less 
under any of the four approaches  to modeling  the EMS than under a Cournot 
Nash  game.  Of course this very  deflationary  regime  also produces  the lowest 
welfare.  ,anii he:anier  is not so schein'eo'et e  he proud  Cf hers. 
The second point  is that inflationary behavior  in the EMS depends on  how 
the system  is formuated,  The snsivsis above  shows that the EMS will be 
deflationary  if exchange rates are fixed, especially  when  Germany  acts as the 
leader.  The EMS is moat oeflarionary  ef the high inflatirn countries use 
exchenge  rates as instruments while the low inflation ones  set monetary 
policy. 
Third,  reductions  In  average inflation need  not coincide with  convergence 
25 of inflation rates.  The most  convergence  is likely  to occut when  members 
cooperatively  set both the exchange  rate and monetary policies.  In  general, 
there is no convergence when  the exchange rate  is fixed between member 
countries. 
Which of these regimes most accurately describes  the EMS?  A complete 
answer is beyond  the scope of this paper.  Instead, I make  two observations. 
First, some evidence does suggest an  assymaetric role  for Germany.  Giavazri 
and Giovannini  (198?) and  Roubini  (1987) argue that Germany has conrir,ued  to 
sterilize  the impact of  foreign exchange interventions on the domestic mousy 
supply.  As they point  out, assymmetric  sterilization  can turn a systam  with 
symmetric  rules for intervention into an  assymmetric  system. 
The second  is that none  of these regimes is likely  to do a good  job over 
the entire 1979-198? period  because none of  these approaches  accurately 
captures the exchange rate  management  issue.  Exchange rates have ramainad 
fixed over long periods of  time.  Adjustments  have come at irregular 
intervals, and  have  been  of  various magnitudes.  With  only a few adjustments, 
it is difficult  to tell whether  or not the timing and  magnitude  has been  a 
cooperative  decision.12 
Ins possibility  is thac Germany acts as the  .eader  hecveen  realignments 
12 Some recent papers  apply models with  fixed o  sts to exchange rats 
adjustment  to examine the timing and  isegnirude  of  exchange rate adjustments 
in  the EMS.  Giavazzi  and Fagano  (1985) assume  that France is a small country 
which  can select  the exchange  rate.  Collins  (l98?b) assumes that France and 
Germany acr cooperatively. 
26 by  setting monetary policy.  The extent  to which other EMS members muac follow 
dependa on the width  of their exchange  rate band  and the importance  of  capital 
controls.  However, thia  soenarco  ia still consistent with cooperation  or 
bargaining  when  the  exchange  rate handa  are adjuated. 
D.  Changes  in  Exper  tatcor's 
One of  the  aos  fraquer.tlv  oitied teasoo fr who  the EMS should heLp 
bring down  inflati n is that it might  altar expootarions  Our analysis so far 
has  ruled out thia (,anrel,  in fact, there is little avidence of shifts whan 
the  EMS was rirst inatituted.  For example. Sachs and i'vplosz  (1985  argue 
that expectations  did not change  until 1982-3. 
We now  suppose tnat after a secies of restrictive measures,  residents  in 
the high  inflation country  there is a decline  in the inertial part of 
inflation  (a  falls).  In the current formulation, the shift cornea about 
through an  expected  real appreciation  (a fall in u).  Alternatively,  the shift 
could be introduced  through the domestic pricing equation (5). 
The  impact on  the average and the divergence  of inflation  rates can oe 
found by  differentiating  the expressions  in Table  2 with  respect to a. 
Since ouc oromar';  Interest Is on  the  relative sizas of the efracrs,  the 
ranking  is shown  below. 
Impact of  a change in  a  on  yr 
:ournoc  <  :s  <  :oo  rari':e  C  Ce roan 
Maan  Excnange  (Both)  Leader 
Impact  of a change  in r  on 
Cooperative  7  Money  C  Cournoc  C  Cooperative,  German 
(Realign)  Exchange  Nash  (Fixed)  Leader 
27 Although  the Cournot-Nash  regime was the most  deflationsry,  a fall in 
the inettisl French  inflation has the smallest effect on  average  inflation of 
EMS members because both  will engsge in  less competitive  deflation,  In  fact, 
the largest payoffs,  in  terms of  lower aversge inflation, come in the Cermmn 
leadership  regime.  Since policy  depends only  on inertial inflation  in 
Germany,  there  is no  offaeccing  change in  equilibrium  policiea. 
Similarly,  che fall in  ir  has  the largeac effect on inflacion 
differentials  under  the two fixed exchange rare regimes.  Aa  diacuaaed  above. 
the ranking of  the Cooperative-Realignment  and the Money-Exchange  regimes is 
ambiguous.  In  both of these regimes, a reduction  in  the initial inflation 
differential  will result in an  offsetting  reduction  in the extent  to which 
polioies contribute  towards inflation convergence. 
This discussion provides one explanation  for the original doubts but 
reoent popularity  of the EMS-Inflation Mypothesis.  During  the first few years 
of  the EMS,  there was little empirical evidenoe supporting  the view that 
joining had fostered convergence.  It  was not until perceptions  of  government 
policies  changed some years  later that observers noted  the rapid deflation  and 
attributed  it to the EMS. 
28 III.  Empirical  Evidence 
This  section assesses some empirical  evidence for the inflation 
convergence  hypothesis.  The results are not conclusive,  They  should  be 
viewed  as a first step to  a detailed analysis of the data, which  is beyond 
the scope of this paper  It is useful  to begin  with an overview of the 
inflation experiences  for EMS and  non-EMS countries.  I  consider  seven EMS 
countries  and fifteen non-EMS countries  from 1974 to l986. 
A.  Overview  of the Infletion Experier.ce 
Table  3  shows  the mean  and standard deviation  inflation rates for the 
two country groups  over different  time periods.  As shown, the group of 
non-EMS countries  had larger  average and  more  variable  inflation rates than 
the EMS countries  both before  the EMS l974-78" and after  the EMS (1979-86) 
was instituted.  The table aiso shows that, while  the average inflation rates 
declined in  both country groups  between 1974-78 and 1979-86, the decline was 
larger  within  the EMS  22%) than outside the EMS (14%).  Furthermore,  the 
standard deviation  of inflation rates increased only  marginally  within  the EMS 
but increased  bsantia11v outside of the Svs:erri.  These  facts provide  some 
support for  4.S-nflaton  Hypothesis. 
13 The EMS countries  are Belgium, Denmark,  France, Germany, Ireland,  Italy and 
the Netherlands.  The nonEMS countries  are Australia,  Austria, Canada, 
Finland,  Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland  the United  KinBdom  and the United  States. 
29 Table  3 -Inflation Rates 
1974-78  1979-86  1979-82  1983-86 
EMS 
average 




















However,  the Table shows no  evidence of  any average reduction  or 
convergence  of  inflation among  EMS members during  the first  three years 
(1979-82).  These indicators  rose in the years following  the second  oil shock 
for both  country groups. 
It  is also important to point out that the comparisons  are sensitive 
to which countries  are included  in the nonEMS  group.  The broad  sample 
intluded  in  Table  3  provides the  'best case' for the Hypothesis.  EMS members 
would  more  closely ressemble a comparator  group which excluded  Portugal, 
Spain and espetially  Iceland.  (Inflation in  Iceland ranged  from 22% to  86% 
during  1974-86.) 
B.  Results From  Panel Data 
A second  approach is to econometrically  examine the differences  between 
the  tvo country groups using pooled cross-section.  cime caries daca.  Tdis 
the approach  followed by  Ungerer et  al. (1986).  They  conclude that the EMS 
did  help to reduce  inflation because  they find  a significant  and negative 
coefficient  on an  EMS dummy variable.  Their  conclusions are explored below. 
For each  country, real  money demand  is assumed to be an  increasing 
30 function of real income, and a decreaaing  function of expected inflation.  As 
shown  in Equation  (27),  a simple log linear structure  is assumed. 
(2')  log,M)-log(P) — $  + $log Y1 
- 
Expressing  the relationship  in  terms of growth rates and solving for 
inflation  gives Equation  (28). 
(28)  — a  - 3y  $ee) 
A  variety  of  options are available  at this point  Following Ungeret et. 
sl. we assume  that the slope coefficients are  identical across countries and 
estimate  equations using  the pooled data  set.  They  substitute  the actual 
change  in inflation  for the difference  in expected  inflation rates,  and 
include a dummy variable  (EMS) which  is one for EMS members after 1979 and 
zero otherwise.  We  begin with this approach,  and then include additional 
dummy variables,  and consider an  alternative  proxy for expected inflation. 
The first  column from  Table 4 reports the results following the approach 
in  Ungerer  et. sI 14  As shoum, the EMS shift term is negative,  although not 
significant.  The magnitude  implies that, other things equal,  inflation  in 
EMS members was 0.9%  smaller during  the EMS period  than either  before  1979 oc 
for noniMS ae.rie:s. 
14 The results in Table  7 diffac from those reported  in Ungeret because  of 
differences  in the time period  and in the group of  nonEMS countries. 
Ungerer reports  statistically  significant  EMS shift parameters.  The study 
also  presents  estimates using  alternative measures  of  inflation and  money 
growth. 
31 Table 4: OLS Results 
Dependent Variable: Inflation (ir) 
1  2  31  4  51 
Constant  0.055  0.064  0.085  0.064  0.081 
(0,006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
M  0.514  0.514  0.238  0.484  0.202 
(0,033)  (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.040) 
Y  .074  - .083  -  .030 
- .076  0.011 
(0.082)  (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.091)  (0.067) 
0.691  0.684  0.651 
(0.079)  (0.078)  (0.087) 
-ir  )  0.407  0.606 
t—1  t—2 
(0.086)  (0,088) 
EMS  (74-78) 
- .022  - .010  - .022  - .008 
(0.011)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
EMS (79-85) 
- .009 
- .007  - .001  - .008 
- .002 
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
1979-85  - .011  - .016  - .008  - .008 
(0.008)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
0.552  0.556  0.280  0.447  0.278 
Std.  Error  0.483  0.480  0.420  0.527  0.361 
# Obs.  252  252  240  252  240 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.) 
Excluding Iceland 
32 However,  there are many poasible explanations  for this finding.  In 
particular,  all countries  may have experienced  shifts in the behavior  of 
inflation  after  1979.  Alternatively,  the EMS countries  could have  had lower 
average inflation  before  the EMS was instituted, 
The second column  of Table  2  presents  the results of a regression  which 
includes two additional  shift parameters  One allows  the EMS period  (poet 
1979)  to diffec  from the pta-EMS period  for all runtries  in  the sample. 
The other allows  a separate  constant  terra for the EMS tether  corntries  in the 
pre-EMS period. 
As shown  in column  2  the additional  vsrlahles  have Iftale  affect on the 
estimated  relstionships  between  money and income  groath and inflation.  But 
the original  EMS shift parameter  decreases  in magnitude  snd in  significance. 
The post-1979  durmsy  end the earlier EMS dummy both  have larger negative 
coefficients.  The latter  Is significantly  different  from  zero.  These 
results provide  no support  for the EMS-Inflation  Hypothesis, 
In fact, if Iceland is axcluded  from the country  list, the point  comes 
through even  more strongly.  These  estimates are reported  in column  3. 
First,  the fit of this simple  regression  equation  deteriorates  significantly. 
Moat of tne i-:ar:oretLon  can oe ettrbuted to tue dectsssao  importance  ot 
money  growth.  Second,  the post  1979 dummy variable  is now strongly 
significant,  while  both ENS dummies decline  in  magnitude  end in  significance. 
Whatever  shift  occurred  after 1979,  occurred among both EMS end nonEMS 
countries, 
Table  4 does  not support  the inflation convergence  hypothesis.  But 
neither  does it refute  the hypothesis  because  the equations  are seriously 
misspecified.  Perhspa  the most  important  problem  is the usage  of  the actual 
33 inflation  differential  as a proxy  for expected  inflaoion.  Since  this 
variable  includes  the current  inflaticn  rate, it is clearly endogenous.  The 
fourth and fifth  columns  of Table  4 addreea this problem  by using  lagged 
inflation  differentials  as a proxy  for expectations.  Columns  4 and  5  report 
regressions which include and which  exclude Iceland respectively.  In both 
cases,  the explanatory  power  of  the estimated equation  declines,  and the 
post-1979  dummy  becomes  less significant. 
Thus,  there  is evidence  of a shift  in  inflation behavior  after  1979 
among  industrialized  countries  as a whole.  There  is little or no evidence of 
any special  shifts  among  EMS members.  However,  these results  should he 
viewed  as suggestive  only.  They  are  very sensitive  to whiob  oountries  are 
included in  the sample.  (They are also to the period  of  estimation.) 
Furthermore,  the equations  explain  only a fraction  of the inflationary 
behavior  of  these countries.  A conclusive  analysis  will require more 
carefully  specified  structures which  allow for differences  among  countries. 
This is an  interesting  area for future  research, 
15 
Another problem  is that  the money  supplies will  be endagenous  for countries 
with fixed exchange  rates and that coefficients  are likely  to differ  across 
countries.  There  are also difficulties of interpretation  if the money  derand 
functions are unstable. 
34 IV ConcIudtn Remarks 
Between  1979 and  1986 there was  an impressive  reduction and convergence 
of inflation rates among  EMS members.  However  coincidence  alone  is not 
enough  to determine  caasality.  The fact that little convergence occurred 
during  the first half of the Systems  existence  makes  the claims  especially 
suspect 
This paper has  argued  that  changing be polic'r rfiime  can  affect  the 
inflationary  otcome in at lest wo ways.  Firc, it  can cnange  market 
perceptions and increase  credibility  in  a dlsinflatiorery program.  Secord 
it  alters  the ru.es of  the game  the instrments vafiabe  to pclicy maaer 
and the tradec,ffs  they  perceive  from  changing  instruments.  In the real 
world,  these  two need  not occur  simultaneously.  Evidence  suggests that 
they  did not,  at least for France.  Vhfie joining  the EMS may have  altered 
the rules  of the game,  it had Little  initial impact of  expectations  or on - 
credibility,  of  the high inflation governments.  Changes  in  credibility, 
price  setting behavior  and expectations  came  a few years  later. 
The paper  developed  a theoretical model  in which changes in the rules  of 
the game  could  be distinguIshed  from changes  in expecation  formation.  There 
are tnree tea La to  nts  first  rf caper  tafions are backward- lancrng  an 
is likely to be less deflationary  than  a noncooperative  Cournot.Nash 
alternative,  However,  more  deflation  is not necessarily  a good  thing.  In 
fact, welfare  is higher  under  less deflationary  EMS regimes  than ander th 
most  deflationary  noncooperatIve  regime, 
Second,  it makes  a difference  how the EMS works,  If  Germany  leads with 
the other members  maintaining  fixed exchange  rates, then  a move to more 
cooperation  would  tend to be deflationary.  However,  if German  leadership 
35 implies  that  the followers  select the exchange  rate,  a mote cooperative 
regime  would  be more expansionary. 
Third,  if a change  in  expectations  comes  about,  perhaps because  of 
persistent  and consistent  policy  makers,  average  inflation  rates will fall 
more under  EMS regimes than  under  the Cournot-Nash  alternative.  Again,  the 
particular  outcome depends  critioally  on how the EMS functions.  This result 
may help to explain  why  many observers  are now convinced  that the EMS itsel.f 
helped  to reduce  inflation  even  though  there were few believers  until 
recently. 
Finally,  simple  cross-section  time-series analysis  does  not show 
evidence  of any shift  in  EMS inflation behavior  after  1979.  Instead,  there 
is some  evidence  that all countries underwent  a shift  after 1979 and that 
inflation  rates  were lower and less divergent within  EMS countries  even 
before  they  joined  the System. 
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